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Politically Charged, Politically Correct: 
Preparing for Landmines during Fieldwork in the Netherlands 
 
Jennifer Long 
  
The tone of Dutch political and 
public debate surrounding immigrant 
integration has recently experienced a 
dramatic decline, resulting in a worrying 
polarization between the native Dutch 
majority and Muslim minority. Right-wing 
politicians and the media have played a 
significant role in the rapid and pervasive 
turning of public and political opinions 
against Muslim immigrants, whom they have 
created as outsiders to the Dutch nation (cf. 
van Bruinessen 2006; Sniderman and 
Hagerdoorn 2007; van der Valk 2002; van 
der Veer 2006). The Moroccan and Turkish 
communities, who are predominantly 
Muslims, have been particularly affected by 
these developments (ECRI 2008:6). Certain 
national incidents, such as the murder of 
Dutch film director Theo Van Gogh, by a 
Dutch Muslim of Moroccan origin, have 
been used to vindicate these opinions, and 
establish a wider group of anti-Muslim 
supporters in the native Dutch majority. 
These factors have resulted in a substantial 
increase in Islamophobic
1
 discourse in the 
Dutch political and public sphere. 
Yet, this is not the only discourse 
that is fuelling the nation‟s political 
situation. Although never particularly 
nationalistic, the Dutch have recently 
become more nationally-oriented in 
response to the increased number of “non-
Western
2” Muslim immigrants living in the 
                                                 
1
 Islamophobic discourses come from Islamophobia 
which is defined as the fear or hatred of Muslims 
and/or Islam (Werbner 2005) 
2
 Dutch immigration officials have defined non-
Western migrants as those who are emigrating from 
Turkey, Africa, South America, and Asia (with the 
exception of migrants from Indonesia and Japan).                
Netherlands. This fear of the “Other” is 
evident in certain immigration policies, 
which have caused stigmatization and 
discrimination against members of minority 
communities living in the Netherlands. 
Therefore, dovetailed with the Islamophobic 
discourse is a movement towards solidifying 
a more distinct concept of the Dutch nation 
and culture, in the face of this Islamic 
difference. Together, these discourses find a 
wide variety and number of supporters from 
all walks of life in the Netherlands, who 
support either the Islamophobic or pro-
Dutch national and cultural identity 
narrative. 
This paper investigates the need for 
politically relevant, albeit politically 
charged, fieldwork in the Netherlands. In 
order to outline the politically tense 
atmosphere affecting the Netherlands today, 
I will provide an overview of immigration 
policy in the Netherlands starting from the 
1970s to the present in order to reveal how 
nationalism has steadily grown in the Dutch 
political arena. This will be followed by a 
description of the level of Islamophobia and 
intolerance directed specifically at Muslims 
and immigrants living in the Netherlands. 
As will become apparent through these 
explorations, ethnographic investigation is 
the best means with which to fully 
understand how the Dutch majority and the 
Muslim minority are engaging with these 
discourses, and how each of these groups fit 
                                                                         
Indonesia and Japan are included in the western 
countries category because they are perceived to have 
similar socio-economic and -cultural positioning to 
that of the Dutch majority population. See: 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&D
M=SLEN&PA=03742eng&D1=0-4&D2=07&D6 
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into the wider narrative of Dutch national 
cultural identity or the narrative of 
“Dutchness”. 
 
The Dutch Nation through the Lens of 
Immigration 
Frank Lechner (2008:282-287), a 
Dutch born sociologist, argues that there is 
no singular, widely understood national 
identity in the Netherlands because it is too 
fractured and diverse a narrative. Yet, since 
the late 1990s, there has been a call to 
immigrants to conform to Dutch cultural 
norms and values in order to integrate better 
into Dutch society. When looking at the 
pattern of immigration policies over the last 
20 years one can see that the Dutch are 
working toward defining a more coherent 
understanding of their own national identity. 
As will become apparent, this national 
identification project affects both the Dutch 
majority and immigrant minority 
communities alike. 
According to Said (2000:177), the 
creation of “us” and “them” categories helps 
legitimize the actions of the nation-state. 
That is, by creating discourses about “them” 
or who Said labels the “Other” (e.g. 
minority population), the modern nation-
state appears as a “sovereign, territorially 
bounded and self-governing social 
collectivity” (Said 2000:177), which fulfills 
the narrative of the “imagined community” 
as being a nation that is culturally 
homogenous and most importantly, 
representative of the majority culture in the 
face of the “Other” (Werbner 2005:6). 
Therefore, the creation of an “Other” also 
strengthens the idea of the nation as a whole. 
In order to understand how the Dutch 
conceive their “Other”, I provide an 
overview of Dutch immigration policy as it 
demonstrates as much about them (Muslim 
immigrants) as it does about us (Dutch 
majority). Although this overview is not 
comprehensive, it will begin in the 1970s 
and proceed into present day policies. The 
majority of this information is taken from 
Han Entzinger‟s work (2003; 2006) unless 
otherwise acknowledged. Entizinger, a 
prominent Dutch sociologist, conducted 
research for the government on immigrant 
integration and so, is partially responsible 
for certain changes to Dutch immigration 
policy from the 1990s onward. 
 
Overview of Dutch Immigration Policy 
The Turkish and Moroccan 
communities are legacies of the so-called 
guest worker policies instituted in the late 
1960s to early 1970s. These immigrant 
labourers found work in the industrial sector 
during a period of economic boom. The 
Dutch government allowed this migration 
because it was thought that these immigrants 
would return to their home once their jobs 
were made obsolete. At this time, the Dutch 
government‟s immigration approach was 
non-existent. In fact, the authorities 
encouraged immigrants to keep their own 
cultural identity in order to better allow 
them to reintegrate to their countries of 
origin, upon their return. This approach 
included associations and consultative 
bodies for immigrants depending on ethnic 
background. It also created a structure of 
institutional separateness, which pushed 
these immigrants to the margins of society 
instead of allowing them to participate 
within the Dutch society. By the end of the 
1970s the Dutch government acknowledged 
that contrary to earlier beliefs, most 
immigrants would stay in the Netherlands. 
As a consequence, the government changed 
its immigration strategy. 
During the 1980s, immigration to the 
Netherlands increased in number and 
diversity. The Dutch saw an increase in the 
number of Eastern European immigrants to 
the Netherlands due to the end of the Cold 
War as well as an increase in the number of 
asylum seekers, most of whom gained 
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refugee status. Also at this time, the number 
of non-Western immigrants increased 
because of the original guest worker 
population living in the Netherlands. These 
workers brought their families to the 
Netherlands through settlement and family 
reunification programmes set up by the 
Dutch government. This increase in the 
number of immigrants was largely attributed 
to the growing trend of Dutch and foreign 
residents to find spouses in other countries 
and settle back in the Netherlands. Although 
the Dutch never used the term 
multiculturalist, most of the policies coming 
from the 1980s could in fact be labelled as 
such. It was also at this time that the Dutch 
began to see immigrants not in citizenship 
terms, but ethnic terms when distinguishing 
between them and the native Dutch 
population. 
The restructuring of Dutch industry 
in the early 1980s left many low skilled 
workers without jobs, many of whom were 
immigrants. By the end of the decade, more 
than one third of all Turks and Moroccans in 
the Netherlands were unemployed. 
Immigrants became a growing burden for 
welfare and social policy regimes; yet, 
mentioning this in public was widely 
considered to be politically incorrect, if not 
racist. This taboo draws from the 
Netherlands‟ Second World War experience 
where the open stigmatization of a religious 
group, namely that of the Dutch Jewish 
community, lead to unprecedented genocide 
of that particular Dutch community. What 
resulted was a resounding silence about the 
declining socio-economic position of 
immigrants. This silence is something that 
would later come back to haunt all involved, 
as dissatisfaction continued to grow among 
the public. 
As early as 1991, the leader of the 
Liberal Party (VVD) Frits Bolkestein 
triggered a public debate on the presumed 
incompatibility of Islam and “Western 
values” which he considered to represent 
Dutch values. Bolkenstein published an 
article in a national newspaper soon after the 
Rushdie affair in Britain
3
 and the l’affaire 
du foulard (the headscarf issue) in France
4
. 
Although this debate eventually calmed 
down, some uneasiness about the place of 
Islam in Dutch society remained. During the 
1994 national elections, the VVD took the 
place of the reigning Christian Democrats 
party and succeeded in shifting the focus of 
immigration policies from respecting 
cultural diversity to promoting immigrants 
social participation. This new direction was 
most notably demonstrated in the renaming 
of immigration policies from minority 
policies to integration policies. From that 
moment on, immigrants‟ culture was seen 
largely as a private affair and providing jobs 
for immigrants became top priority. 
Overall, the most important policy 
put in place in the 1990s was a Dutch 
language and civic education class that 
became mandatory for all non-Western 
immigrants because it was thought that their 
lack at Dutch proficiency prevented them 
from getting jobs. At this time, the cost of 
these courses was paid for by the 
government, and although unemployment 
rates amongst immigrants dropped over the 
                                                 
3 
The Rushdie Affair refers to the incident where the 
author Salman Rushdie angered Muslims around the 
world by his irreverent depiction of the prophet 
Muhammad in his novel “The Satanic Verses”. 
Rushdie even had a fatwa placed on him by the 
Iranian president at the time and because of this, 
certain relations between the UK and Iran ceased. 
Due to the violence of some of the “anti-Rushdie” 
demonstrations, Islam and Muslims were negatively 
portrayed in the media (see Said 1997). 
4
 The headscarf issue in France refers to the case in 
Creil (a small town close to Paris) where three young 
female students came to school wearing a headscarf 
and were refused entry by the school authorities in 
1989 (Göle 2007). This eventually developed into a 
nationwide ban of all conspicuous religious symbols 
worn in public primary and secondary schools in 
2004. 
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course of the 1990s, non-Western 
immigrants still received 40 percent of the 
distributed welfare. Whether or not 
immigrants‟ lower socioeconomic position 
created tension between Dutch native and 
immigrant communities, the topic of 
immigrant integration into Dutch society 
became more frequent within public and 
political debate. 
In January of 2000, Paul Scheffer, a 
prominent member of the Labour Party 
wrote an article entitled “The Multicultural 
Tragedy” which discussed the failure of the 
Dutch multicultural programme and 
impending doom of an ethnic underclass of 
non-Western immigrants who did not feel 
attached to Dutch culture and society and 
who were also unwilling or unable to 
integrate. What Scheffer did was voice a 
concern that many Dutch people felt, but did 
not express about continuing immigration 
and a rapidly growing Muslim population. It 
appeared to Scheffer that the only way out 
of the current predicament was to again 
change immigration policy to a more 
assimilative approach. It should be noted 
that if Scheffer had written his article ten 
years earlier, he would have been considered 
a racist and his article and views tossed out 
of parliament. Now however, Scheffer found 
himself speaking for a silent majority of 
Dutch natives and his views taken seriously. 
Scheffer‟s outcry is generally seen as the 
dramatic turnaround of the Dutch public 
debate and Dutch policymaking regarding 
immigration and integration. It was in this 
climate of increased sensitivity regarding 
immigration in general and Islam in 
particular, and following the events of 
September 11
th
, 2001, that Pim Fortuyn 
stepped into the spotlight. 
Pim Fortuyn taught sociology at the 
University of Groningen and Erasmus 
University in Rotterdam. However, once his 
contract was discontinued, Fortuyn began 
public speaking tours and writing for the 
right-wing newspaper Elsevier concerning 
the malady of the current Dutch government 
(Entzinger 2006:129). It was at this time that 
Fortuyn became involved in politics, which 
eventually lead to him starting his own 
political party called List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst 
Pim Fortuyn, LPF). With Fortuyn at its 
head, LPF was set to participate in the May 
2002 national elections. Fortuyn‟s platform 
was primarily directed against the 
contemporary immigration procedures 
which he saw as too liberally oriented and 
which ignored the concerns of the common 
(Dutch) people. Throughout his campaign, 
Fortuyn championed his right to freedom of 
speech (Article 7 in the Dutch constitution) 
to the point of breaking Article 1 of the 
Dutch constitution, which forbade 
discrimination based on life principles, 
political preference, race, sexual orientation, 
or religious belief. Fortuyn did this by 
portraying Islam as the largest growing 
threat to the Netherlands at the time 
(Buruma 2006:39). According to Fortuyn, 
Islam was a religion that was fundamentally 
opposed to the Netherlands‟ liberal and 
sexual policies and one that would 
compromise Dutch women‟s right to 
equality (van de Veer 2006:115). Fortuyn 
conveyed these ideas using his flamboyant 
nature, political savvy, and charisma that 
shook up the usual humdrum of the Dutch 
parliament. While his views and 
showmanship made him a popular figure in 
the media, Fortuyn was thought to have little 
chance at winning many seats in the 
upcoming national election on account of his 
overly right-wing political platform. 
Then, on May 6th 2002, a short time 
before the national election, Fortuyn was 
shot and killed by a Dutchman who believed 
him to be a threat to the Netherlands‟ 
minorities. In the wake of his assassination, 
Fortuyn‟s LPF was voted into office, 
grabbing 17 percent of the vote. This party 
outcome marked the first time in over a 
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century that a populist agenda won a 
significant number of seats in Dutch 
parliament (van de Veer 2006:115). 
Although the LPF collapsed within three 
months due to bickering amongst the party 
members, Fortuyn had left his mark on 
politics and within greater society. This can 
be seen in the changes to political and public 
opinion, which became more nationally 
oriented and in general attitudes toward 
immigration, which became more 
conservative. After the LPF fell, the newly 
elected government led by Jan Peter 
Balkenende remained true to the populist 
agenda of curtailing immigration and 
developing a more strict plan for integration 
among immigrants (Lechner 2008:136). 
They also wanted the mutual respect for 
minorities to be based on fundamental Dutch 
norms and values (Lechner 2008:136). At 
this point, immigrants were held solely 
accountable for their lack of integration into 
Dutch society (Entzinger 2006:131). This is 
also when nationalism began to take hold in 
the political agenda. 
Much of the policy changes in the 
early 2000s concerned integration, asylum-
seekers, and lowering the number of 
immigrants coming into the country. The 
new Minister of Integration, Rita Verdonk, 
stated that Dutch citizenship involved 
speaking the Dutch language and observing 
basic Dutch norms (Smeets 2004:21 as 
referenced in Lechner 2008:163). Therefore, 
the Dutch language was deemed one of the 
deciding factors of national social cohesion 
(Bjornson 2007). To this end, the 
government discontinued all minority 
language programs in Dutch schools. New-
comers from the category of non-Western 
immigrants were required to take (and pay 
for) civic integration courses as well as pass 
a test in order to receive permanent 
residency permits (Doomernik 2004:34). 
Although these integration courses were not 
new to the immigration program, the cost of 
the exam, information package, and permit 
increased significantly; in addition, the cost 
of the program had to be paid before 
entering the country (Vink 2007:346). These 
policy changes were followed by a proposal 
of a new bill that would have required “old 
comers” who received welfare benefits to 
take these courses. Although this bill was 
never passed, the message was loud and 
clear: that immigrants should integrate 
(according to Dutch standards) if they 
wanted to take part (or advantage) of the 
system. 
In addition to civic integration 
education, the government created policies 
to slow family reunification and marriage 
immigration practices. This was seen to be a 
necessary step after a report was released 
which found that 75 percent of Turkish and 
Moroccan Muslims living in the Netherlands 
returned home to marry and then brought 
back their spouses to live with them in the 
Netherlands (van Selm 2005). Therefore, 
policies went into place that only allowed 
people above a certain income level to bring 
spouses from abroad. In a similar vein, the 
Dutch government passed a law that took 
away the automatic residency granted to 
asylum seekers whose claims had been 
under review for three years or more in 
order to decrease the number of asylum 
seekers that were naturalized into the 
country. Furthermore, in the private sector, 
the government dissolved the requirement 
that all employers must report the number of 
minorities they employed (Lechner 
2008:163-4), thereby leaving less 
opportunity to combat racial discrimination 
in the workplace. 
These measures disproportionally 
affected immigrants from Morocco, Turkey, 
and the Antilles Islands. In this way, the 
integration of immigrants into Dutch society 
came at the expense of immigrants‟ cultural 
diversity and a certain amount of their 
individual autonomy. Unfortunately there is 
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little information published concerning the 
thoughts of Dutch Muslims at the time of 
these policy changes. Accounts by scholars 
range from those approving of the changes 
to immigration policy to others condemning 
the changes, however, few reports, articles, 
or otherwise utilize the voice of Muslims 
living in the Netherlands
5
. 
These changes to policy were 
punctuated by another event that again 
deepened the perceived divide between the 
Muslim population and the Dutch majority: 
the murder of Theo van Gogh. In 2004, a 
Dutch-born Muslim fanatic, Mohamed 
Bouyeri murdered van Gogh for directing an 
anti-Islamic film entitled Submission. The 
murder itself was particularly gruesome, 
involving van Gogh being shot and stabbed 
in broad daylight while he was cycling on 
his way to work. Bouyeri added religious 
elements to the crime by attaching passages 
from the Qur‟an to van Gogh‟s body and 
also by claiming that his reasons for 
committing this crime were due to van 
Gogh‟s and his companions‟ misdeeds 
against the Qur‟an (Buruma 2006:4-6). 
According to Peter van de Veer, a well-
known Dutch anthropologist, the murder of 
van Gogh triggered a nationwide panic 
(2006:111). While not all accounts share van 
de Veer‟s level of drama, indeed Buruma 
acknowledges that “most people kept their 
cool” (2006:7), the majority of accounts 
agree that after this event, life between 
Dutch natives and Dutch Muslims 
fundamentally changed. The debate about 
the Muslim presence in the Netherlands has 
maintained a high level of energy and the 
discussion most often concerns their 
questionable allegiance to the Dutch nation. 
                                                 
5 
The literature to which I am referring, are those 
sources published in English. This is not to say that 
accounts, which use Muslim voices, are not available 
in Dutch or Arabic. See Sunier 2005 and Bjornson 
2007 for exceptions. 
After the murder of van Gogh, 
certain policies were introduced that 
according to the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance
6
 (ECRI) 
were in direct violation of human rights 
policies. For example, the Municipality of 
Rotterdam gained permission from the 
Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
Environment to ban people who do not meet 
a specific level of income from living in 
certain neighbourhoods within Rotterdam. 
This policy, called the Urban Areas (Special 
Measures) Act, allows municipal authorities 
to ban “persons who do not have an income 
from employment from residing” (ECRI 
2008:23) in what are already seen as 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The Equal 
Treatment Commission (Commissie Gelijke 
Behandeling, CGB) found that although this 
policy is only used as a last resort and for a 
temporary period, it did indirectly 
discriminate members of Turkish and 
Moroccan origin (ECRI 2008:23). Yet, non-
Western immigrants and their families are 
not the only communities who are affected 
by these policies and the atmosphere that 
they create. 
A greater awareness of national 
belonging can be seen in the outcome of the 
most recent elections held in October 2006. 
During the 2006 national election, 
politicians who supported a tough nationalist 
approach to integration policy, and who paid 
particular (negative) attention to Muslim 
immigrants, received approximately 17 
percent of the vote. If this number appears 
small, it should be remembered that 17 
percent only represents those voters who 
believe in an extreme nationalistic or right-
wing political platform and not those 
political parties who still hold a hard stance 
                                                 
6
 The ECRI is the Council of Europe‟s monitoring 
body, combating racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, 
and intolerance in greater Europe, from the 
perspective of the protection of human rights. See: 
http://www.coe.int/t/E/human_rights/ecri/ 
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on immigrants and immigration, which 
represents a larger portion of voters. 
One could view the more recent 
events in the Netherlands as a right-wing or 
conservative social movement. It is 
important to acknowledge that the statistics 
and the discourses of right-wing or 
conservative movements show only a very 
narrow picture of the situation. Furthermore, 
the danger lies in dismissing these right-
wing and conservative narratives as 
“irrational” (Eldering 1985:666-667) and 
thinking that these discourses do not hold 
any influence within the public or political 
spheres. To interpret such ideologies as an 
extremist point of view or as fringe 
phenomena obscures the rational choices 
made by individuals. Furthermore, while 
racism and prejudice are not reasonable 
responses to community conflict, ignoring 
these responses might also overlook some 
partially legitimate grievances that help to 
fuel populist opinion (Berlet and Lyons 
2000:14 as cited in Edelman 2001:303). It 
also hides the fact that right-wing bigotry 
and scapegoating are firmly rooted in the 
mainstream social and political order 
(Edelman 2001). Therefore, in the face of 
difference, nationhood has become a more 
important identity for certain Dutch natives 
and has become a more pervasive discourse 
within the Netherlands, overall. 
According to Lechner (2008), the 
Netherlands has no single definitive version 
of what constitutes their national identity. 
Yet, this is not an issue because while 
national identity discourses function to 
exclude, and at times dominate, other 
cultural identities of those living within the 
nation (Appadurai 2006:41-43), they are not 
the only identification available to those 
living within the Netherlands (for example, 
one‟s gender or religious affiliation could be 
a category of identification). Therefore, 
national identity can coexist with other 
identities and have a variety of 
understandings, whilst reinforcing a greater 
identification with “the nation” and, in 
certain circumstances, segregating and 
excluding those dissenting identities. Thus, 
the idea of Dutch national and cultural 
identity can be a starting point from which 
to filter and frame other identities and 
experiences of both Dutch natives and non-
natives living within the Netherlands. 
As was evident from the progression 
of Dutch immigration policies from 
multiculturalism to integration to 
assimilation, Muslim immigrants play a dual 
role in the creation of the Dutch national 
identity. Muslim immigrants are asked to 
assimilate into the Dutch national cultural 
identity while at the same time, they are 
being used as a reference (as the “Other”) to  
help define Dutch national identity. In order 
to better understand how these policies 
affect both the majority and minority 
population and their relationship with one 
another, I will discuss the current state of 
Islamophobia in the Netherlands. 
 
The Pervasiveness of Islamophobia in the 
Netherlands Today 
The facts about Islam in the 
Netherlands today are as follows: Islam has 
had a growing presence in the Netherlands 
since the 1970s; Muslims currently make up 
six percent of the Netherlands population 
and their numbers continue to grow; it is 
said that Muslims will outnumber the native 
Dutch in their three largest cities within ten 
years (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 
2007:13). For some members of the Dutch 
parliament and of the public, the number of 
immigrants living in the Netherlands is 
already too large. It is too large because 
Muslim values, as informed by the Islamic 
religion, are perceived to be inherently 
incompatible with those liberal and secular 
values which are said to characterize Dutch 
society. Therefore, according to these 
supporters, there is a real clash of the 
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civilisations occurring in the Netherlands, 
which was exemplified in the murder of 
Dutch film director Theo van Gogh. 
In a report released in February 
2008, the ECRI found that Islamophobia 
was becoming a growing trend in the 
Netherlands (2008:36-38); “Muslims of the 
Netherlands have been the subject of 
stereotyping, stigmatizing and sometimes 
outright racist political discourse and of 
biased media portrayal and have been 
disproportionally targeted by security and 
other policies” (ECRI 2008:36-37). While 
these negative accounts coexist among other 
accounts that provide a more diverse, 
balanced, and positive representation of 
ethnic minorities, there is a persistent, 
negative representation of Muslims and 
immigrants in the press and on the television 
(van der Valk 2002:7). This is a distressing 
state of affairs for a country that was once, 
and in certain respects still is, known for 
tolerance. 
It is important to ask how these 
perceived incompatibilities are affecting the 
communication and interaction between 
these groups at the grassroots level. In the 
most tense period directly following van 
Gogh‟s murder, the Netherlands witnessed a 
sharp rise in racist violence targeted at 
Muslims (ECRI 2008:37). There was an 
increase in violence against Muslim 
institutions, such as mosques, Islamic 
schools, and property damage, which 
included racist graffiti on shops owned by 
Muslim proprietors.  Reports of racist insults 
seemed ever pervasive, for example, on the 
streets, on public transportation, and during 
sporting events. Leaflets expressing anti-
Muslim sentiment increased in circulation. 
To this day, Muslim immigrants experience 
discrimination in different areas of life, 
including employment or access to public 
places (ECRI 2008:39). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that 
these divides are becoming increasingly 
intensified. This is evident though the 
increased numbers of youth hate groups 
such as the Lonsdale group who were 
responsible for neo-national activities and 
the Hofstad group, who were said to be a 
militant Islamic group. There has also been a 
dramatic increase of hate propaganda over 
the Internet from pro- and anti-Muslim 
groups and from pro- and anti-Dutch 
nationalist groups (ECRI 2008:38). While 
these examples appear to represent the 
negative attitudes of individuals or a very 
small group of people, there are other 
examples of more sweeping trends among 
the public, for example, in the housing and 
education sector. 
As of 2004, minority students 
comprised over 30 percent of the total 
population at the schools in Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, and The Hague (Lechner 
2008:141). The high percentage of minority 
students is attributed to proximity of 
minority housing to the school as well as the 
phenomenon of “white flight”. “White 
flight” occurs when Dutch parents send their 
child to a school outside of their local area 
in order to avoid “black schools” which are 
predominantly filled by immigrant students. 
This also seems to be the case when looking 
at the demographics of cities. In Amsterdam, 
non-Western ethnic minorities comprised 39 
percent of the population in 2004 and it is 
suggested that in the year 2030, this 
percentage will be above 50 (Lechner 
2008:139). These demographic patterns are 
produced by the tendency of minorities to 
settle in cities (Lechner 2008:142) and the 
growing trend of the Dutch majority to 
move to suburban areas. 
There is much discussion of the 
Moroccan, Turkish, and other Middle 
Eastern populations segregating themselves 
from the majority population, into what has 
come to be called “dish cities” (Buruma 
2006:21). Dish cities are named for the 
satellites that line the rows of houses that 
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connect these immigrants to the satellite 
television and Internet from their home 
country. The inhabitants of these enclaves 
are thought not to have integrated, which is 
usually determined by their (in)ability to 
speak the Dutch language. From these 
trends, it would appear that Muslim and 
non-Muslim populations are separating 
themselves to a certain degree. These trends 
also show evidence of action on the ground 
level that mimics the xenophobic and racist 
discourse seen in the political sphere. What 
is obvious at this point is that the 
construction of national and cultural identity 
or “Dutchness” is a volatile business, and in 
order to investigate the current situation, it is 
important to acknowledge the politically 
charged nature of this environment and 
those involved, and how this affects 
potential research projects, like my own. 
 
Politically Charged: Conducting Fieldwork 
in the Netherlands Today 
My research will investigate how 
Dutch native and immigrant communities 
live and communicate together while 
engaging in discourses of nationalism, 
belonging and Islamophobia. This research 
seeks to understand how individuals who 
identify as being a „native‟ or „non-native‟ 
accept or deny certain aspects of these 
narratives and create their own 
understandings of who belongs and who 
does not belong to the Dutch nation
7
. In 
order to accomplish this, my study will 
incorporate these discourses in addition to 
the broader social field in which they 
operate (Edelman 2001:311). As 
anthropologists tend to study marginalized 
people (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007:117), 
                                                 
7
 The idea of belonging to the nation has important 
implications in that those understood to belong have 
better access to national resources (for example, 
social, political and financial standing, better quality 
of life, and more employment opportunities) than 
those who do not.  
there is a need for anthropologists to pay 
more attention to a nation‟s majority 
population. Indeed, scholars have called for 
more research involving the Dutch majority 
population in order to understand their 
involvement in these affairs (Entzinger 
2006). Furthermore, anthropologists and 
other social movement scholars have largely 
skirted the issue of right-wing collective 
action, largely because researchers tend to 
study those movements of collective action, 
which they identify with and support, or 
which have an attractive cause (Edelman 
2001:301-302). This leaves a gap in the 
literature of less attractive social 
movements, like Islamophobia in the 
Netherlands. 
It is important to look at the idea of 
nationalism at this point in time because 
although some academics have argued that 
we live in a post-national world (for 
example, Appadurai 1996) this assumption 
is over-simplified and over-stated. As is 
apparent from above, the Netherlands has 
begun to search for a more distinct and 
salient national identity in the face of 
“otherness”, which has created an 
opportunity for unification among those 
identifying as non-Muslim immigrants. 
These processes however have also 
negatively affected non-Western immigrants 
and their families in real ways (see ECRI 
findings above). Therefore, an investigation 
into the resurgence of national identity in the 
Netherlands will show the larger process of 
community relations, the effects of group 
affiliation or ascription, and the level of 
cohesion within the Dutch community. 
Within the current era of 
globalization, the idea of the nation is more 
sophisticated than once theorized because 
“the nation” is no longer thought to be 
bound to its geographical borders or 
ignorant of its many moving parts, that is: 
the influence of supranational media outlets, 
communication technologies, and the 
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movement of those associated with a 
particular nation both within and outside of 
its physical territory. Furthermore, for the 
Netherlands, the external forces of the 
European Union and the Netherlands‟ place 
in the international realm influences their 
conceptions of what constitutes the Dutch 
nation. Therefore, the appropriateness of 
ethnographic fieldwork in this context lies in 
the ability to see the process of identity 
construction, in many different social 
locations, that is, on a local, national, 
transnational, and international scale. 
There were relatively few 
ethnographic studies carried out (and 
published in English), on the relationship 
between native Dutch and Muslim 
immigrants communities; however, since the 
mid 2000s, social scientists‟ interest in this 
area has greatly increased (Bjornson 2007; 
Hagendoorn, Veenman and Vollergh 2003; 
Margry and Roodenburg 2007). Notably, the 
Ethno-barometer project looked at matters 
of cultural diversity in 2005 using focus 
groups that included native Dutch residents 
and Moroccan immigrants, in Gouda. This 
study found that the relationship between 
these perceived dichotomous groups was not 
as antagonistic or fragmented as presented in 
the media or by alarmist politicians but that 
Dutch natives believed immigrants had sole 
responsibility for integrating into society 
(van Bruinessen 2006). In 2006, a 
sociological survey found similar beliefs in 
the majority of its native Dutch respondents 
who thought that immigrants should 
culturally assimilate in both their private and 
public lives, while the immigrant 
respondents believed integration was only 
necessary in their public life (van de Vijver 
et al. 2006:114). However, while the authors 
concluded that “public attitudes towards 
multiculturalism ha[d] not undergone 
appreciable changes in the last five years” 
(van de Vijver et al. 2006:102), they failed 
to give any explanation for the preceding 
gap and misperceptions between groups. As 
evinced by the preceding evidence, the 
current relationship among Dutch 
communities merits further investigation, 
and in my opinion, further ethnographic 
investigation as it is best suited to address 
the complexity of this situation. The 
following is a discussion concerning the 
strengths and potential drawbacks of 
ethnographic research in the Netherlands. 
 
Why Ethnography? 
An ethnographic investigation allows 
for an analysis beyond statistical evidence as 
it is based on research that focuses on how 
people engage with larger discourses in 
everyday life. It is through participants‟ 
lived experiences that I will come to 
understand how individuals, with particular 
group affiliations, interact with one another 
and how their experiences have affected 
their relationships and points of view, over 
time. In my opinion, this is something left 
out of sociological surveys, which tend to 
provide only a snapshot of the situation 
instead of the storyline that ethnographic 
investigation offers. Therefore, ethnography 
will allow me to dig deep into the current 
situation in the Netherlands, which is 
important in a field that is as tense and 
politically charged as it is. Through studying 
lived experience I am also able to see where 
and how social and political discourses 
affect different groups and individuals and 
how these discourses and the institutions 
that create them change in importance over 
time. Furthermore, ethnography allows me 
to negotiate the categories of “native Dutch 
majority” and “Muslim immigrant”. By 
using ethnographic methods, I will be able 
to see how these people transcend and 
complicate these categories imposed on 
them by the media, the Dutch government, 
public discourses, and one another, in their 
everyday lives. 
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Moreover, because this project 
involves following social and political 
events within the political and public arena 
in the Netherlands (which over the last five 
to ten years has at times proven to be quite 
tumultuous), ethnographic investigation 
allows me to remain flexible in the event 
that a new and important topic surfaces. This 
is an important feature of this methodology 
since I will be conducting research during 
the year 2010 when there will be a national 
election and the Dutch soccer team 
competes in the FIFA World Cup. In the 
past, these kinds of events have proven to 
increase demonstrations and feelings toward 
Dutch nationalism (Lechner 2008). 
Therefore, depending on their significance 
to my interlocutors, I am capable of 
following the lead of any influential players 
or events, discourses, or themes, as they 
arise, once I am in the thick of things. It is 
this flexibility that makes ethnography best 
suited toward my intended study. 
Finally, by conducting ethnographic 
fieldwork, I am able to incorporate 
reflexivity into my research concerning my 
own position as a Canadian born, middle 
class, white, female researcher, with Dutch 
heritage. This reflexivity is important to 
keep in mind as my personal background 
and experiences will surely affect my access 
and interpretation of certain situations and 
people. It is also a possibility that my 
opinions of Islamophobia or Dutch 
nationalism might again affect my access to 
certain informants and information. 
Although I do not agree with Islamophobic 
statements and attempt to remain neutral 
concerning Dutch nationalism, I may find it 
hard when, and if, asked for my opinion and 
allegiances. 
In conclusion, there is much 
evidence of the growing dichotomy between 
the native Dutch and Muslim populations in 
the Netherlands today. The current tension 
between community groups provides an 
adequate background into which people 
question their national identity and 
belonging to the larger group. This situation 
necessitates further investigation and in my 
personal opinion, further ethnographic 
analysis, in order to understand the 
complexities of the situation and to avoid 
the pitfalls of oversimplifying or over-
identifying the level of the current 
dichotomy between these groups. 
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